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IN 7HE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UT,'\H 
-ooo-
CRANE COlli' ANY dba CRANE ) 
SUPPLY COl1PA!lY I ) 
) 
Plaintiff- ) 
Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
KEN DAHLE 1 MARV ERICKSON, ) 
EA~L ZARBOCK, PLUMBERS ) 
SUPPLY COt1PANY, ALAN !1ASER, ) 
MARJIE SADLER, and DOES I ) 
through X, ) 
) 
Defendants- ) 
Respondents. ) 
) 
) 
Case No. 15022 
BRIEF OF RESPOUDE~>ITS 
STATEME:->IT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant seeks a modification of the judgment entered 
by the trial court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOlVER COURT 
On ~1ay 6, 1~76, the Honorable James Sawaya signed 
a tenporary restraining order restraining respondents from 
soliciting customers and suppliers of the appellant. On May 
14, 1976, a hearing on appellant's motion for a preliminary 
injunction was heard before the Honorable G. Hal 7aylor and 
said notion for a prelininary injunction 'vas denied. 
On Hay 19, 1976, appellant initiated and filed a 
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motion for reinstatement of temporary restraining order or,_ 
'·· 
preliminary injunction with the Supreme ~ourt of the State o; 
Utah. After argument was heard from both parties appellant' 
motion was denied on June 14th, 1976. Beginning on July ll,-
1976 this case was tried without jury before the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft. The lower court found that there was no cor-
spiracy to injure appellant's business and no unfair competit; 
but did award damages in the form of restitution for the vale 
of two sales diverted from appellant. Judgrnen t 1vas granted 
only as against respondents Dahle, t-1aser, Erickson and Plumk' 
Supply and not against respondents Zarbock and Sadler. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the findings 
of the lower court and judgment therein. 
IHTRODUCTO~Y S'I'ATENENT 
The present case concerns the change of employment·:: 
four d t Who Were Unhappy and desJ individuals, the respon en s, _ 
1 · h · They D_. erf armed of improving their employment re atlons lp. 
certain acts in preparation for their change of employment r: 
the lower court found that those acts did not constitute a c:, 
. f responrlents fidur: 
spiracy to injure appellant in violatlon o 
ary duty. 
Thef main issue before the court is whether the )owe: 
~rr-"' b the lo 
c.- """' the facts found Y e-iil ~ in concluding froM court 
court that no conspiracy existed. 
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The facts and conclusions found by the lower court are 
contained in both the findings of fact and the court's memoran-
dum decision. Since the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law are inadequate for the reason that they are incomplete 
and void of many facts and conclusions found by the lo\'rer court 
that are relevant to the substantive issues ~n appeal herein, 
this court may properly consider the memorandum decision to-
gether with the findings of fact and conclusions of la1v. This 
proceedure is stated in Sparague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 
4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 (1956) where this court stated in 
a footnote at page 693 that: 
"An opinion or memorandum of decision 
filed bv a court sitting as trier of the 
factAand conclusions of la\\ 3.re inadequate. 
If the opinion or memorandum contains the 
findings of fact, that is sufficient." 
Appellant in its brief and statement of facts alleged 
facts that \'Tere not found by the lower court. It is also 
contended by respondents that appellant's attempt to argue 
facts not found by the lower court is improper since this 
court is not the trier of fact '"'hen the case before the court 
is a case at law. This is discussed further in respondents 
argument herein below. However, realizing the possibility 
that this court may classify the present case as a case in 
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equity, the respondents have also presented argument up~ 
that premise, although keeping in nind the statement made 
by this court in Kier v. Condrack, 478 P.2d 327 (1970), at 
p. 329 that: 
"Although this court may review the facts in 
this case in equity, it should be kept in 
mind that we may do so in the light of the 
evidence as believed by the trial court, and 
not necessarily as urgued upon us from the 
point of view of the defendants (appellants)." 
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STATE!1ENT OF FACTS 
A. Rule 75 (p) (2) Statement. 
Appellant, Crane Supply has set forth in its brief a 
statement of facts. In compliance with Rule 75 (p) (2), respond-
ents Dahle, ~aser, Erickson, Zarbock and Plumbers Supply indi-
cate below to what extent appellant's statement is inconsistent 
with the facts. 
1. Respondents disagree with most of appellant's first 
paragraph on page 2 of its statement of facts. 
(a) It is correct that April 20, 1976 was Dahle, Haser 
and Erickson's last day of employment with appellant. However, 
the record indicates that on said date said respondents gave 
a two-weeks notice (TR 1-29; 2-52;3-61; Findings of Fact No. 2) 
but due to appellants policy to terminate salesmen the same day 
they give their notice (TR 1-28) said respondents were not 
asked to stay and work said two weeks (TR 1-30). Further, 
the record is silent as to any specific prior arrangement by 
respondents to terminate although Haser and Erickson decided 
during the last week of April, 1976, to terminate with appellant 
and seek employment with Plumbers Supply (TR 2-63; 2-77) • 
(b) Dahle did contact Zarbock at the end of Harch 
1976 in regards to employment but was not offered a position 
until after April 16, 1976, with final terms being made nuring 
the last week of April 1976 (TR 2-16,17). 
-5-
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(c) The record is clear that no orders for waten,c:.l 
materials were placed for Plumbers Supply by Dahle or any re•. 1 
I 
pondent prior to ~1ay 3, 1976 (TR 2-12; 2-45; 2-112; 2-12 41 " 
that the one order to Clow Corporation (Plaintiff 1 s Exhibit ' 
6-p) although back dated was in fact ordered Hay 11, 1976 
(TR 2-124, 125, Exhibits 24-D and 12-D). Further, Plumbers 
Supply had an inadequate inventory in waterworks on 'lay 3, i,.: 
and had to order from competitors including appellant to sat:q 
orders received after Hay 3, 1976 (TR 2-127). 
I 
(d) Although Dahle participated in the input ford 
I 
lant 1 S projection of sales (TR l-61) and ordered inventory,:, 
specifically made efforts in April 1976 to sell overstocked 
items and maintain an appropriate inventory (TR 2-16,17). 
2. Respondents agree with most of appellant 1 s seco::l 
paragraph of its statement appearing on page 2 and 3; however! 
the form notice (Exhibit P ·2) 1vas only mailed to some of ao:•l 
lant 1 s customers of which some were also customers of Plwnberl 
Supply with the majority being sent to Plumbers Supply custo:j 
' (TR 2-142; 2-145). Further, said notice had an effective dat: 
of May 3, 1976, and was mailed on April 29th and 30th in ant:·! 
cipation of respondents being fired when they gave their two·l 
weeks notice (TR l-80). 
3. Respondents agree with most of appellant 1 s thir. 
3 althDC paragraph of it statement of facts appearing on page 
-6-
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the first sentence is not factual. It is correct that Dahle 
was asked in February 1976 to prepare sales books but said books 
contained very little information (TR 2-14) and were neither used 
by Dahle, 11aser or Erickson nor of any value to them as salesmen 
(TR 1-49; 2-15, 53 & 78). It is not correct to state that appel-
lant had explicit procedures in regards to bid quotes since 
neither Dahle, Maser nor Erickson had any knowledge of any 
relevent policy of appellant and rarely used or kept any copies 
of quotes prepared (TR 1-46, 47; 2-8). 
4. Respondents disagree with most of the fourth para-
graph of appellant's statement of facts beginning on page 3. 
It is correct that Maser and Erickson threw their sales books 
away (TR 2-53; 2-74) since said books did not contain any infor-
mation that was not retained by appellant in its office (TR 2-15). 
It is correct that Dahle disposed of the extra copy of a print-out 
only because it had been marked up and was no longer usable to 
appellant (TR 2-50). It is not correct that respondents left 
any catalogs in the warehouse or that the sales book or extra 
copy of the printout were necessary for appellant's business. 
On the contrary nothing '"as taken or destroyed by respondents 
that was necessary for appellant to continue its business. The 
only i terns taken by respondent 1-1ere hand written notes and junk 
which were returned to appellant prior to the hearing before 
Judge Taylor (TR 2-2,3) (transcript of hearing on preliminary 
injunction p. 99) 
-7-
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5. Respondents agree tVi th most of the fifth par;:, 
of appellants statement appearing on page 4, except for the: 
statements in regards to the notice and the ordering of in,1,,, 
which have been contraverted in paragraph 1 above. Further, 
Plumbers Su~ply had previous to/Aay 3, 1976 dealt with and:. 
chased from some of said suppliers (TR 2-110, 123). 
6. Respondents agree \vi th the sixth paragraph of 
appellant's statement appearing on page 5. 
7. Respondents disagree tVi th most of the seventh 
paragraoh of appellant's statement appearing on page 5. Da'. 
gave input to appellant for projections (TR l-61) and did 
keep ap;::>ellant' s inventory down as above mentioned. 1\?pelk 
statement concerning typical lead time is directly contradic:, 
to the record as referred to by appellant (TR 2-46). 
8. Respondents disagree with most of the eighth~'! 
graph of appellants statement appearing on page 5. ADDellan:, 
statement that res;:>ondent Plumbers Supply had not pre~~ouslr! 
been in the water works business is not true and directly co:·l 
tradictory to the record. Plumbers Supply had been in the 1 
I 
sewer and \vaterr,rorks business for over 10 years and a compeL·-~ 
of appellant and had started to increase their waterworks 
business over a year before Dahle contacted Plumbers SupplY 
for employment (TR 2-11, 122, 123). Plumbers .Su?ply had a]so 
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previously dealt with and bought from most of the suppliers of 
waterworks materials (TR 2-110, 111, 112 & 123). Appellant, 
as a new venture approximatelY" 8 years ago with inexperienced 
personnel, in approximately 60 days, attained sales figures 
similar to those projected by respondents (TR 3-68, 69). In 
regards to the inventory of Plumbers Supply the record is 
clear that Plumbers Sup~ly purchased a large portion of their 
inventory in May, 1976 from their competitors including 
appellant because of their own inadequate inventory (TR 2-127, 128). 
The majority of appellant's statements in this paragraph are 
speculative and are not supported by facts. 
9. Respondents agree that appellant's controller 
testified as to its loss as mentioned in the ninth paragraph 
of appellant's statement appearing on page 6. Hmvever, the record 
indicates that said estimates \vere J:>ased on sales of the first 
four monthsof 1976 and not on sales for a similar period during 
1975 (TR 3-49, 50). Further, the record is silent as to whether 
the loss to appellant was gross profits or net profits. 
Appellant's controller also testified that the estimated loss 
was due to the loss of employees and would not have been as 
great had appellant replaced their lost employees (TR 3-48). 
10. In regard to the tenth paragraph of appellant's 
statement ap?earing on page 6, respondents agree that an order 
lvas placed by Bountiful City with appellant for 200 meter boxes, 
however, ap~ellant fails to mention that Dahlein connection with 
-9-
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s<~id order did prepare another ticket for the other 150 box: 
while employed by appellant and gave it to another employee, 
appellant since Dahle did not order meter boxes while emplo~·· 
by appellant (T:E'l. 3-65, 66). Contrary to appellant's statene: 
Bountiful City was not advised that said boxes were not bac~. 
ordered and in fact believed they were still on backorder,;:,,. 
they placed an order \vi th Plumbers Supply (TR 2-70). 
B. Respondents Statement of Facts. 
The trial court recognized in its memorandum deCJS; 
the controlling facts of this lawsuit. However, out of an 
abundance of caution, respondents have set forth many non· 
controlling facts above to counter the inaccuracies and 
omissions of appellant's statement. However, respondents 
believe that the below statement of facts is sufficient to 
enable this court to decide this appeal: 
l. Appellant's business here involved was a whole:'! 
I 
\vaterworks division that dealt solely with municipalities an•' 
utility contractors on a competitive bicl. basis (memo der:. p.l! 
All of appellant's waterworks customers were listed in putli: 
directories and accessable to and dealt Hi th all coJT1,petitors ' 
(TR l-74, 75; 3-54, 55). 
2. Dahle was a sales manager (TR 1-44), ·~sera~ 
E , k 1 ( R 2 -1 73) and Sadler was a secreta: r1c son were sa esmen T. -~ , 
(TR 2-87) for appellant. There 'vere no employment contracts 
-10-
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involved and the association was an employment at will (memo 
dec. p. 4) . 
3. Prior to April 30, 1976 appellant knew of Dahle's 
dissatisfaction with his job (TR 1-76; memo dec. p. 1) and that 
Maser, Erickson and Sadler were unhappy and did not get along 
with appellant's office manager (TR 2-62, 76 & 95). 
4. T"ha t on April 30, 1976, Dahle, Maser, Erickson and 
Sadler gave their bm weeks notice of termination but were term-
inated the same day by appellant (paragraph A.l. above). 
5. Prior to Dahle's termination on hpril 30th, 
1976, he performed the following acts: 
(a) Contacted Zarbock during the end of March con-
cerning employment and was offered a job sometine after April 
16, 1976 (TR 2-128; memo dec. p.2) 
(b) Discussed with Zarbock the feasibility of 
expanding Plumbers Supply waterworks business (TR 1-63; memo 
dec. p. 2) . 
(c) Helped prepare a form notice (Exhibit P 1-2) 
announcing a change of employment effective Hay 3, 1976 (findings 
no. 4). 
(d) Did not make sure the 150 meter boxes ordered by 
Bountiful City were back ordered. (TR 3-60,96}. 
(e) Took several orders for appellant on April 30, 
1976 (TR 1-82). 
(f) Cleaned up all possible problems for appellant 
on April 30, 1976 (T~ 1-83, 84) and continued after termination 
:..n-
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to assist appellant with its problems and help appellant'sc0 
(TR 1-84 through 86). 
6. Prior to or upon his termination Dahle did nc: 
(a) Coerce other respondents to terminate (T'l. l-1': 
2-63, 77 & 96; memo dec. p.2). 
(b) Overstock appellant's inventory (TP, 2-16;merr.o', 
(c) Solicit appellant's customers or divert any 
orders of a?pellant (TR 1-82; 2-18; memo dec. p.4). 
(d) Take any materials (other than his own misce::,·f 
neous handwritten notes that were returned) belonging to 
appellant (TR 2-3) cr use any of appellant's materials 1qhile 
employed with Plumbers Supply (TR 1-86). 
7. Subsequent to his termination, Dahle did acce::l 
and deliver an order for the 150 meters from Bountiful Cit1' :·1 
hP. believed was on back order. with aPpellant (TR 3-60, 96 ) . 
8. Prior to t1ay 3, 1976 Zarbock contacted and ne~·; 
otia tied with suppliers in regards to increasing the watenvo:'i 
business at Plumbers Supply (TR 2-110, 123) and made prepara::l 
including financing to increase said business (T'l. 2-130, 13;). 
Zarbock advised Dahle to give two weeks notice and alloiVed 
form notice to be mailed upon belief that other responde~! 
\vould be terminated upon giving notice (T~ 2-129) · 
9. Prior to his termination, Maser individuallY 
and without the knowledge or consent of any other respondent 
(TR 2-18) cancelled an order for a valve and suhsequentlY ~ 1'' 1 
-12-
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said order with Plumber Supply (TR 2-56) although said valve 
was never purchased from Plumbers Supply (Findings of Fact No.6). 
Maser also threw away his sales book (TR 2-53). 
10. Erickson upon termination turned over important 
material to an employee of appellant and made certain that jobs 
in progress would be taken care of (TR 2-75, 85) and did not 
take or destroy any material that would be useful to appellant 
to carry on its business (TR 2-78). He did throw away his 
sales book (TR 2-74). 
11. None of the respondents solicited the customers 
of appellant prior to their termination (memo dec. p.3). 
12. Appellant's suppliers and customers were still 
available to it and appellant was neither deprived nor prevented 
by respondents or their acts from continuing its dealings with 
its own customers and suppliers (TR 1-33, memo decision p.3). 
Appellant had the material, information and man power to con-
tinue its business. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S APPEAL FOR LEGAL RELIEF LHUTS THIS 
COURTS SCOPE OF REVIE\'7. 
It is well settled law in Utah that this court, in 
cases at law tried before the court without a jury, will only 
examine the evidence as is necessary to determine questions of 
-13-
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law. Further, that this court will not pass upon the suffic:, 
of the evidence to justify the findings or judgment, or subs· 
·I 
another evaluation of the evidence, unless there is no legitr. 
proof to support the findings or judgment. In no cases at~ 
either with or without a jury, will this court determine quest., 
of fact, but may in equity cases. Lyman v. Town of Price, ~:1 
90, 222 P. 599; Sine v. Salt Lake Transport Co., 106 Utah 2~ 
147 P. 2d 875; Pixton v. Dunn, 120 Utah 658, 238 P. 2d 408; 
and Article VIII Section 9 of Utah Constitution. 
Since under Utah law both actions at law and actic: 
in equity can be consolidated in one action it is sometimes 
difficult to ascertain whether the case on appeal is one of 
equity or law. Such is not the case here for it is clearly 
evident that the relief sought on appeal by appellant is leg;: 
relief of damages for an alleged tort and not equitable relie' 
The distinction to be made is whether legal relief is sought 
rather than equitable in determining whether the appeal is~ 
the case at law or one in equity. In 27 Am Jur 2d Sec. 112 , .. 
page 637 it states that: 
" .•• That the suit is held to be juticable at 
law, and not in equity, where the purpose thereof 
is the recovery of damages lvhich have been su~- ,, 
tained by reason of fraud, a fraudulent conspuacl 
or a breach of a fiduciary duty." 
(See also Ambler v. Choteau, 107 US 586, 27 L ed 322, S ct W 
and Koeon v. Corpeiro, 200 A2d 708.) Appellants are seeking 
damages which they alleged were sustained by an alleged con-
-14-
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spiracy and breach of a fiduciary duty and this kind of relief 
is clearly legal relief and as such limits the scope of review 
on appeal by this court. 
This court is not required as suggested by appellant 
to review the evidence and make its inferences therefrom, and it 
would appear to be improper in an appeal on a case at law to 
argue the evidence presented in the lower court as appellant has 
done. The critical issue before this court is one of law as to 
~hef"___!h~ _f_a~!s _9~ound_]?y _the lower court support the lo,.,er 
court's de_cision _tllat _respondents did not conspire to injure 
aEpel~a_11t' s bus:i,I}ess and _there-fore appellants were not entitled 
to darnagE!S other than those _ctw_ard~d. This court's scope of 
review is limited to those facts found by the lower court and 
not those inferences and bits of evidence urgued upon this court 
from the point of view of the appellant. 
Respondents submit that the lower court's judgment 
was in conformity with its findings and should not be disturbed 
(Mason v. Mason, 160 P.2d 730 (1945). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOU)ID THAT THERE T·7AS NOT 
A CONSPIRACY BY RESPONDENTS. 
Although the trial court awarded damages against more 
than one res2ondent, appellant's effort to construe this as 
evident of a conspiracy is not supported by either the facts 
of the present case or the courts memorandum decision. It is 
-15-
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correct that ~1aser individually and without the knowledge of 
any other respondent diverted an order for a valve and that 
Dahle was not very careful in making certain that appellant 
received an order for 150 ~eter boxes that Maser helped 0~~ 
while employed by appellant. The record is clear that these 
two acts were independently done and that only one responden: 
participated in each of the acts. However, the recor<'! also 
indicated that Plumbers Supply received a benefit from the sa:' 
of the meter boxes. The facts of the present case support L 
conclusion that judgment should have been entered only again: 
Maser, Dahle and Plu:nbers Supply for the loss due to the salE 
of the 150 meter boxes to Bountiful City and judgment agains: 
only Haser for the diversion of the valve order. The court 
below in its memorandum decision did not explain its reasonr 
for awarding the judgment as it did, and respondent's counse: 
inadvertently failed to object to the joint judgment upon t~: 
grounds stated above. It is apparent that a substantive 
basis for the court's award of a joint judgment lvould have 
been the unjust enrichment realized by Plumbers Su!)ply upon 
the sale of the 150 meters to Bountiful City and the potent: 
sale of the valve. There is no basis for a conclusion ~a 
conspiracy and the court below correctly found, "th"lt there:· 
. I 
pondents were not involved in a conspiracy to defraud (appe. 
of its customers and business •.. nor ..• planning to injme~ 
destroy (appellant's) business in the particular field here 
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involved" (memodec. p.3) 
Appellant's attempt to torture the court's memo 
decision into supporting a conspiracy not only miscontrues the 
decision but is an ex~ercise in false logic. Appellant's argu-
ment in point 1 as supported by the cases cited therein is 
based on the major p~mise that in a conspiracy all partici-
pants are liable for the damages ensuing from the wrongful act. 
Appellant's minor premise~ is that damages were awarded jointly 
against more than one respondent, and therefore appellant's 
conclusion is that there was a conspiracy. 
Appellant's argument fails for the following reasons: 
1. There is no evidence in the record to show that 
the respondents participated together in any wrongful acts. 
2. The court below founn there was no conspiracy 
therefore there must be another basis for its joint damages. 
Such a basis would be unjust enrichment. 
3. Appellant's conclusion is false since conspiracy 
is not the only basis for awarding joint damages. 
Neither the fact that the court below failed to 
explain its awarding of damages nor the failure of respond-
ents' counsel to correct the a?parent mistake of the joint 
judgment is sufficient basis to establish a conspiracy \'lhen the 
evidence fully supports the opposite. 
-17-
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POPTT III 
":'HE FINDINGS OF F.li.CT OF THE T'\IAL COURT SUPP0RT 
ITS CONCLUSION THAT RI:SPO:lDEN'T.'S DEl NOT CONSPIRE TO IllJTJRE 
APPELLANT IN VIOLi\TION OF THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTY. 
It appears to be settled law that although an emolc-
has a fiduciary duty to his employer he can make preparations 
for future employment and upon termination com:oete for and 
solicit his former employer's customers. (see 55 Am Jur 2d Ss 
697) Two crucial issues that appear in the majority of cases 
are first >vhether certain acts prior to termination constitute 
solicitation or preparation and second whether those acts 
are in violation of a fiduciary duty and injure the employer. 
(see 28 ALR 3d 7) The above two issues were carefully conside:l 
by the court below as it heard the evidence presented and dre:. 
its inferences and conclusions therefrom. It is submitted tri,· 
as this court considers thecourt'sfindingsitwill be conpelle: 
to the same conclusion that the respondents did not conspire 
to injure appellant's business hut were only desirous of i~ 
proving their employment and being able to continue to earn a 
living in a free and competitive economy. 
Appellant in its brief cites Hoggan & Hall & Hig~ 
Inc. v. Hall, 18 Utah 2d 3, 414 P. 2d 89 (1969) and Duane~ 
Company, Inc. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (195 41, 
cited by this court with approval, as authorities on the issue 
of what constitutes a conspiracy to injure another's business 
and what acts constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. 
In the Hoggan case this court held that the follo~Vi: 
-18-
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acts prior to the termination of the defendant, a director of 
plaintiff's corporation, of personally contacting five specific 
advertising accounts or customers that he serviced for the 
plaintiff and advising them that the plaintiff was in trouble 
and the customers should let him service them in the future and 
that the other accounts were going with him,constituted a breach 
of a confidential relationship and a solicitation of the accounts. 
The Hoggan case is clearly distinguishable from the 
present case upon the same basis that the majority of cases in 
this area have been decided (see 28 ALR 3d 7). The key issue 
is the solicrlation of customers while still under a fiduciary 
duty as an employee. There was no finding in the present case 
that the respondents personally contacted customers of the appel-
lant and solicited their business while still in a~pellant's 
employ. In fact, appellant's only allegation of solicitation 
is that respondents sent a form notice one day prior to their 
termination to some customers of appellant advising them of 
respondents change of employment. The notice was to be 
effective after termination and there is no finding that any 
of appellants customers received said notice prior to respond-
ents termination date. It is settled law that prior to his 
termination an employee has the right to make arrangements and 
preparations to compete with his employer upon termination and 
to advise his employer's customers that he is severing his 
present relationship and going into business for someone else 
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(See Am Jur 2d Sec. 697, p. 26 and Restatement of Agen9: 2c 
Sec. 393 comment "e .. ). 
A good case on point and one quoted v1ith consisL 
in this area is Continental Car-na-var Corporation v. Hose!; 
24 Cal. 2d 104, 148 P 2d 9 (1944), where the district manage:! 
the former employer sent out a form letter to approximately,, 
of the customers of the former employer advising them that r.; 1 
leaving the plaintiff and assuming the position of sale mana: 
of another corporation. The court held that the defendant r.; 1 
the right to advise customers of the plaintiff that he was 
severing his business relations with the plaintiff and wu 
engaging in business for himself. (Also see Aetna Bldg. Main~e:j 
Co., Inc. v. Nest, 39 Cal 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11 [1952].) 
Another case on point ann one relied upon by appelL 
is Southern California Disinfecting Companv v. Lomldns, 183 C; 
App. 2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr. 43, 53 (1960). The court in thatd 
also stated that an employee may advise his custoners that heJ 
changing employment, prior to termination thereof, by means c' 
! 
cards and orally telling the cusotners of the change. The ke·. 
issue in that case •.vas again the solicitation of custoJTlers pr:: 
to termination. 
In Duane Jones Company, a rel1e: Inc., v. Burke, supr' 
I 
upon by appellant, the court held that the acts discussed bel;· 
of solicitation of specific 3.ccounts prior to ternination was 1 
violation of a fiduciary duty. The Duane Jones case is clear~ 
distinguishable from the present case on the basis of solid'. 
tion. In that case the defendants prior to their terrninatio~.' 
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incorporated a new business, personally contacted specific 
accounts, pre-sold them on their plan to either buy out their 
employer or take all the accounts with them upon quitting, and 
solicited and acquired those accounts for the new corporation 
while still receiving pay as employees of the plaintiff. Whereas, 
inthe present case, no customers were personally contacted or 
pre-sold prior to termination, and there was no predetermined 
course of action whereby the respondents would acquire appellant's 
confidential customers prior to setting up a new business and 
thereby destroy appellant's business. 
The distinguishing issue that the courts in Duane 
Jones and other cases have wrestled with is what acts prior to 
termination are just preparation for new ernplo~ent and not a 
breach of a fiduciary duty or a conspiracy to destroy anothers 
business. As discussed above, sending out a notice of changing 
employment is not a breach of a fiduciary duty. Further, the 
negotiations between Zarbock and Dahle, Maser, Erickson and 
Sadler for new employMent and their giving their two weel~s 
notice on the same day are neither a breach of a fiduciary duty, 
for the reason that said acts are necessary for any change in 
employment, nor a conspiracy to destroy appellant's business, 
sincG thev '•'ere emoloyed hy will. ':'he followinc:: cases support 
responden-~s ryosi =:ion. 
In Fidelity, Company vs. Federal, Company, 217 Cal. 
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307, 314, 18 P. 2d 950 953, the California Supreme Court madE 
the following stateQent: 
"That the defendants 1vere free to leave the 
employ of plaintiff and engage in a similar 
business there can be no doubt. For men to 
agree and plan to enter business as associates 
even though they have a design to draw their 
patronage from many rivals, or all that a 
particular rival may have does not constitute 
them conspirators. Practically every copart-
nership, corporation, or private individual 
which enters into business does so with the 
intent of drawing all the business it possibly 
can from all competitors. If it were not so, 
there would be no such word as 'competion' in 
business." 
Also, in United Aircraft Corporation v. Boreen,(B' 
dapa) 284 F. Supp. 428, where defendants attempted to and die 
lure from the plaintiff's employment valuable employees to 
work with a newly formed competitive corporation, the court 
held that even though injury to the former employer might hav:1 
been reasonahly foreseeable, the plan to form the competing 
corporation, even though the defendants acted in concert and 
secretly, manifested an intention of the defendants to better 
their own lot rather than an intention to injure the former 
employer. The court 1vent on to state that the crucial fact 
was that the defendants were all employed at will and that i' 
an outside employer wishes to obtain the services of such emvJ 
he can do so as long as he does not attempt to 
conduct by the former employees. There was no 
induce wrongfU: 
f indingf in the 
present case that Zarbock induced any wrongful conduct by t)< 
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respondents. 
In Spring Steels, Inc., v. Maloy, 400 pa. 354, 162 A 
2d 370 (1960), where the former employer's vice-president con-
ceived an idea of a new competing business and pursuaded other 
employees to go along with him and even conceived the plan of 
resigning in a group and it was alleged that said action con-
stituted a conspiracy to cripple plaintiff's business,the 
court held that those acts did not constitute a conspiracy and 
stated: 
"That since there was no formal contract of 
employment, that to enjoin a former employee 
from entering into such employment as he 
wishes is in the nature of a restraint on 
one's liberty." 
Restatement of Agency, 2d Sec. 393 comment "e" does 
suggest that it is a breach of a duty where a number of officers 
or employees agree to leave simultaneously and without giving 
the employer an opportunity to hire and train replacements or 
as a tool of extortion to seize the business as was evident in 
the Duane Jones, supra. However, in the present case the respond-
ents gave a two weeks notice, would have stayed to train new 
personnel and assist in the transition, and even after being 
terminated continued to help appellant serve its customers. 
Further, appellant was left with employees capable of contin-
uing the business. Said comment "e" also states that before 
termination an employee can make arrangements and preparations to 
compete with his employer upon termination. The right to make 
-23-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
preparations is further supported in United Aircraft Cornorc 
v. Boreen, supra where the court said; 
"That even though it is certainly not in 
the employer's interest to have the employee 
begin preparation to compete while still in 
his employ, this kind of derogation from the 
general notion of loyalty is not an actual 
breach of fiduciary duty". 
Appellant alleges in its brief that Dahle breache: 
his fiduciary duty by discussing with Zarbock the feasibilit 
of his employment with Plumbers Supply and the availability 
of suppliers. Appellant relies on Southern California 
Disinfecting Company v. Lomkins, supra. The Lamkin case is 
also clearly distinguishable from the present ca~. In tha: 
case the plaintiff's customers were found to be confidentia' 
and the defendant's use of and conversion of the customer lii' 
and his solicitation and diversion of sales was considered t 
the court as "trade secret larceny". Further, the defendant 
assistance to the new employer was not mere advice as was 
Dahle's but the conversion of confidential information and 
diversion of customer orders prior to termination. In the 
present case the customers of appellant were not confidenti: 
and Dahle neither converted confidential information nor us: 
h bl o h 0 b 0 ~_he findings c'1 t e same to esta ~s a competlng uslness. ' ~ 
court below estab-' ished that: Da!-·.le rraintc:ined an appropriate 
inventory while in appellant's employ and did not make anY 
specific inventory orders for Plumbers Supply until after h: 
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termination. His only act was that of giving advise on the 
feasibility of obtaining inventory and increasing the business. 
Th2 findings showed that the information concerning 
the suppliers of waterworks was public knowledge and that the 
additional suppliers were obtained by Zarbock without the use 
of any of appellants information. As was mentioned above an 
employee can prepare for a change of employment and it is a 
common business practice to at least have some indication you 
can provide a service before you offer it. Dahle's help with 
suppliers was indeed only preparation since the relationship 
between appellant and said suppliers was not affected at all. 
Appellant further alleges in its brief that respond-
ents converted and destroyed documents and records of appellant 
to further respondents business interest and destroy appellant's 
ability to compete. Appellant again relies on Southern Calif-
ornia Disinfection Company v. Lomkins, supra. The distinctions 
between that case and the present case of what acts constitute 
a conspiracy to injure are again quite clear. In the Lornkin 
case, the defendant, prior to termination, converted informa-
tion on confidential customers contained in a route book and 
stuffed blank pages in said book to deceive plaintff and give 
defendant more time to use said information and solicit 
customers. Some of the information defendant took was not 
contained on the records in plaintiff's office. In the present 
case respondents did not take anything prior to termination 
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and did not use any confidential information of appellantt 
solicit customers of appellant either before or after termir: 
It is true that Erickson and Maser threw away their sales~ 
but the evidence shows that the books were of no value ~ 
the salesmen, had limited information of which some was out~j 
and that the names and addresses contained in the books were 
contained on the print outs and other records available in t 
office of appellant. There was no finding by the court that 
dicated the loss of said books damaged appellant's ability t 
continue to compete. In fact the record indicates that all 
important information on jobs in progress was left with appe: 
lant and respondents continued after termination to help apr' 
lant in those jobs in progress. 
There was no finding by the court that any of appelt 
jobs in progress were effected by any acts of the respondent 
or that respondents used any information of appellant's to 
obtain any of said jobs in progress. These facts clearly di: 
tinguish the present case from Abbott Redmont Thinlite Cor~· 
ation v. Redmont, 475 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1973), relied uponb' 
appellant. In that case the defendant while working for P~ 
tiff persuaded architects to write in plaintiff's product 
specification in their bids and then defendant quit plaintW 
and used the information on specifications to submit his bic 
and to secure the contract. The court's holding that defend: 
viola ted a fiduciary duty was based on the "tangible expectc: 
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that the plaintiff would have received the contract had the 
defendant not used the confidential information of his bid. 
In the present case the respondents did not receive any orders 
or contracts that appellant expected to receive through the 
use by respondents of appellant's information. 
The respondents did take with them the skill and 
knowledge they obtainedwhileworking for appellant but they 
are entitled to that. In Matthews Paint Company vs. Seaside 
Paint and Lacquer Company, 148 Cal. App 2d, 168; 306, P 2d 113 
(1957), where salesmen learn the names and addresses of their 
former employer's customers as well as their individual and 
specific requirements and needs respecting the type and 
quality of lacquer products desired by such customers and 
used said information to compete against their former employer, 
the court held that a salesman necessarily becomes somewhat 
acquainted with the particular requirements of his customers, 
but that the knowledge that he obtains in this manner is not 
in and of itself confidential information which is the pro-
perty of the employer, when the information could have been 
acquired by any of the former employer's competitors and 
might have been as well known to the competitors as they were 
to the former employees. Another case on point is Vendo Co. 
v. Long, 213 Ga 774, 102 SE 2d 173 (1958), where the court held 
that customers, equipment, prices, price quotations, new 
machines, method of doing business and procedures were not 
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trade secrets nor confidential information for the reason 
that they were not particular to the plaintiff's business 
and known only to it and its employees. The court furth~ 
stated that the employee has the right to take with him 
upon termination all the skill he has acquired, all the 
knowledge he has obtained and all the information that he has 
received so long as nothing is taken that is a trade secret 
or property of the employer. Even more on point are the word: 
of the court in Revcor, Inc. v. Fame, Inc. 85 Ill. App. 2d 
350, 228 NE 2d 742 (1967), where the court stated that; 
"Our free economy is based upon competition, 
that one who works for another cannot be com-
pelled to erase from its mind all of the gen-
eral skills, knowledge, acquaintances and the 
overall experience which he has acquired during 
the course of his employment, and that the 
success of a person who was engaged in sales 
depends largely upon his personal friendships 
and the confidence inherent therein, such a 
person cannot be prevented from seeking out 
customers of his former employer when he 
has entered into a competing business or 
gone to work for a competitor." 
Dahle took with him his !mow ledge of how to deal ' 1 
suppliers and how to manage a waterworks business. These ski 
were his to use to better his lot. Haser and Erickson took 
with them the knowledge concerning customers that 1•as also 
known by other competitors. There was nothing taken by the 
respondents that was found to be confidential or proprie: 
The sales books that were thrown away only contained in£orrr' 
that respondents, appellant, and competitors had access to 
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through other means. The personal handwritten notes taken and 
returned contained similar information. The present case is 
very dissimilar from those cases cited by appellant and the 
court below correctly determined that the above action by 
respondentsdid not constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty or 
unfair competition. 
It is apparent from appellant's brief that there are 
d: conflicting inferences that can be drawn from the record. 
However, those inferences drawn by the court below were reason-
able to justify its conclusions. Pertaining to making conclu-
sions and inferences the court in Duane Jones, supra at page 
245, had the following to say: 
"If conflicting inferences are possible as 
to abuse or opportunity, the trier of the 
facts must make the choice between them. 
There can be no revision in this court 
unless the choice is clearly wrong." 
The tr1al court's choice of inferences and conclusions made 
were clearly right and supported by the record. 
Appellant relies upon Lockwood Grader Corp. v. 
Backhaus 129 Colo. 339, 270 P.2d 193 (1954), to establish the 
elements of a civil conspiracy. The court in that case con-
sidered all the elements together in deciding that a conspiracy 
did not exist and suggested that each element needs to be 
related to the other elements. In the present case the 
evidence supports the lower courts findings of no conspiracy 
for the reason that although a few of the elements were present 
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there was no connecting relationship. In regards to the~ 
element that more than one person needs to be involved itu 
evident that Zarbock negotiated with each of the other resp1 
ents which would satisfy this element, but the object of th< 
combined act of negotiations was for future employment and r. 
an unlawful act. Zarbock and Dahle did discuss the feasabi: 
of increasing Plumbers Supply waterwork' s business but agair, 1 
object was for future employment and the discussions were not 
unlawful. The respondents did terminate the same day, but L 
was not unlawful as discussed above, and the fact that they c) 
two weeks notice and continued to assist appellant indicates! 
the object was not to injure or destroy appellant's business. 
The second element is that there needs to be an 
object to be accomplished. Appellant suggests that the objer 
was to destroy its ability to compete but this is neither sur· 
ported by the evidence nor is it connected with the other eld 
Maser's diversion of a valve order and his objective appear :I 
record, but although his act was a breach of good faith it •,;a 
an independant act not known of by any other respondent priori 
termination. The failure of Dahle to direct Bountiful City:: 
purchase the meters from appellant was also an independant ac 
I' 
These two independant acts neither support a conspiracy nor· 
alleged object since appellant could still submit bids and 
obtain orders from the customers involved. 
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The third eleMent that there be a neeting of the minds 
on the object is not supported by the findings. There was a 
meeting of the minds in regards to the form notice and the time 
of giving two weeks notice but these acts were not unlawful as 
shown above and there was no finding that they affected 
appellant's ability to com?ete. The only apparent unlawful acts, 
the fourth element, were the t•·1o independant acts discussed 
above. The disposing of the sales hooks \vere independant acts 
and although they should have been returned therewas no finding 
that the information lost was either confidential or non-replace 
ableorthatitdidaffect appellant's ability to compete. 
The last element mentioned in the Lockl.·mod case is 
that the damages must be a proximate result of conspiracy. This 
element also fails in the present case for the reason that the 
only proximate dar.tage found by the lower court ~Vas due to the 
two independant acts for ~Vhich the lower court awarded damages. 
There is no finding to support appellant's contention 
that its loss of business or ability to compete was a proximate 
result of respondents disposing of the sales books, taking 
their handwritten notes, negotiating \vi th Zarbock, or sending 
the form notice. The loss of its business was due to the loss 
of its employees which act was lawful and encouraged by appellant. 
Further, availability to compete was based on the availability 
of its suppliers and the opportunities of bidding for jobs, 
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neither of which were affected by any acts of the responden• 
(memo decision page 3) . 
The findings further substantiate the conclusion t: 
by the court below that appellant failed to sustain the bur~ 
of proof resting upon it to prove all elements of a conspira 
by a preponderance of the evidence (see Lockwood, suura, ,. 
196). 
Perhaps respondents could have changed their e!'lplc 
rnent in a different manner but the acts done to effectuate •: 
change were more a result of misunderstanding or mistake tha: 
that of conspiracy. This court recognized this in Hoggan,~ 
at 91 \vhere it was stated in regard to acts of solicitatio~·: 
to termination that: 
" ••• we would prefer to use the term 'mis-
understanding' or 'mistake' as to fealty 
to that of 'conspiracy.' Hany people are 
victims of an honest misunderstanding of 
their rights under a contract. This seems 
to be the kind of a case where an ounce of 
legal advice may have been worth a pound of 
judicial cure,--but strangely enough, the 
most honorable of people shun the doctor and 
die of cancer and others stay away from 
lawyers only to visit the referee in bank-
ruptcy." 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT APPELLANT i·i.\: 
NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER DM1AGES FOR LOST PROFITS. 
The lower court in its meno decision correctlY 
analyzed the evidence presented when it stated on page): 
"There is no doubt that plaintiff's sales 
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within its water works division were 
greatly reduced in the months of May and 
June, 1976 after the four defendants con-
stituting its water works division staff 
left its employment on April 30, 1976, but 
this was due to the fact that with its 
sales force gone its ability to make sales 
became almost nil until new or other em-
ployees could be hired or transferred to 
handle its business, but the fact that 
defendants left to go to work for a com-
peting company does not render defendants 
liable ~o plaintiff for its loss of busi-
ness. The same result would have occurred 
regardless of what these four employees 
would have done after leaving plaintiff." 
It seems equitable to award damages for losses that 
are the "natural and probable results of wrongful acts" as 
appellant contends and its cites infer. However, there is no 
finding nor is there evidence that appellant's reduction in 
business was a result of any cause other than their loss of 
employees. Appellant's own witness, Mr. Stinson, concluded 
that appellant's loss of sales was due to a loss of employees 
and had appellant replaced said employees the loss would have 
been greatly reduced. The damage issue in the present case 
is somewhat different from the Hoggan and Duane Jones cases 
where the losses were directly attributed to the solicitation 
and taking of confidential accounts prior to termination. In 
the present case the soliciation was after termination and the 
customers were not confidential. As mentioned above there was 
insufficient evidence to establish a conspiracy or to establish 
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damages as a proximate result of respondents acts. Responde: 
neither used any propria tary information to compete, nor wer' 
the loss of the sales books and handwritten notes a cause of 
any loss of sales. Of greater importance is the fact thatn 
jobs in progress of appellant were affected or lost due to 
respondents acts. 
Not only does the evidence show that appellant's k 
of profits ~ not the proximate result of any wrongful act 
of the respondents, but also that said damages were not 
established with reasonable certainty. The law is well settl, 
that there can be no recovery if losses are uncertain, conje:· 
tural or speculative (15 Am Jur, Damages Sec. 150, 157). On 
this point in U. S. v. Griffith, C.A. Utah, 210 F 2d 11 at 
p. 13; the court stated: 
"The actual damages which 1vill sustain a 
judgment must be established, not by con-
jectures or unwarranted estimates of 
witnesses, but by facts from which 
their existence is logically and legally 
infereable. The speculations, guesses, 
estimates of witnesses, form no better 
basis of recovery than the speculations 
of the jury themselves." 
Appellants witness, Hr. Stinson, arrived at his estimates of! 
losses by the appelant by means of a formula that did not ta.•. 
into account important variables such as previous year P~~ 
and whether the loss was a gross figure or a net figure. 
-34-
i 
...... 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
His estimates were not" logically and legally inferable". 
The lower court's thesis that the same results \vO'.lld 
have occurred regardless of what the four employee respondents 
would have done after leaving a9pellant is supported by the 
evidence. Respondents were not the only ones "around to com-
pete" and the evidence is clear that all the other competitors 
called on the same customers and submitted bids on the same 
jobs. The cause of appellant's loss of business was not due 
to outside competition specifically by the respondents but 
appellant's own failure to retain the respondents for two 
weeks while replacements were secured and trained which would 
have lessened the effect that any competitor would have on 
appellant's business. 
Appellant has no basis for additional compensatory 
damages as the lower court correctly found. Any additional 
loss suffered by appellant was due to their own acts or the 
consequence of the competitive business in which they were 
involved. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
It is clear that punitive damages are awarded only 
when the conduct is done willfully and maliciously as was 
stated by this court in Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 379 
P.2d 380 (1963), cited by the appellant. The court below 
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correctly viewed the evidence which indicated that the dh~ 
sions of the two orders although im~roper were not done mal· 
iciously or with willful intent. Dahle was contacted by 
Bountiful City for said meters and had back ordered them fo: 
appellant. It was not with malicious intent that he accept; 
the order and filled the same from Plumbers Supply. Maser 
thought the valve might be deleted from the job and antici· 
pating possible problems cancelled appellant's order. Agair 
the act of reordering the valve through Plumbers Supply wa; 
improper but does not meet the criteria of maliciousness. 
Also, these two acts were done independently and as such we:· 
not part of a conspiracy to injure. 
The only other improper acts found by the lower 
court were the throwing av1ay of the incomplete and replacea~. 
sales books and the taking of personal handwritten notes. : 
both instances the respondents believed the materials belonc 
to them and were of no use to the appellant. It is evident. 
the respondents did not consider their acts wrongful and tha: 
there was no element of •.vantoness or bad motive as required 
r1ills v. Murray, 472 S.W. 2d 6, 17 S.W. 2d 6,17 (Ho. Al)p.l:· 
Also, the mere fact that the lower court approved the granti 
of a temporary restraining order based on the fact that the 
above mentioned materials were taken does not make it impL: 
or even suggestive that the respondents acted 1-vith malice. 
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They made a mistake in judgment as to disposition of said 
materials. 
Appellant cites Southern California Disinfecting 
Company v. Lomkins, supra, as an example of punitive oamages 
being awarded. As was pointed out above that case is clearly 
distinguishable form the present case in that it involved 
fraud and solicitation of confidential customers prior to 
termination. The awarding of exemplary damages in the 
Lomkin case was to discourage fraud and malice which are 
not evident in the present case. 
As mentioned above respondents neither southt to 
damage appellant's ability to compete nor did their acts prior 
to termination affect said ability. The court below heard all 
the testimony and correctly concluded from the actions of the 
respondents that there was no justification for an award of 
punitive damages. 
su~~Y 
The present case is a case at law. The court belo1q 
evaluated the evidence and made its findings. From those 
findings it concluded that no conspiracy existed. The case law 
is clear that those specific facts found by the court below do 
not constitute a conspiracy to injure appellant' business. 
But even if this court treats this case as one in equity the 
conclusion would be the same. The preponderance of the evidence 
supports and substantiates that conclusion. 
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Appellant concedes in its brief and the findi~s 
establishes the fact that appellant's customers and suppl~ 
were not confidential or propritary information. Therefore. 
any solicitation of said customers and suppliers after re~ 
pondents' termination .,.,as not unfair com:r:>etition, and appel· 
lant' s loss of business that came from that solicitation an~ 
competition was fully justified. The critical issue then, 
presented to this court, is whether the acts of resJ?ondents 
prior to termination constituted a conspiracy to injure 
appellant's business and whether said acts did in fact i~u 
appellant's business. 
As was argued above, the only acts of the :-espond 
proved by the evidence found by the court were: 
1. ''egotiation for new employment; 
2. Discussions of feasibility; 
3. Sending out form notice; 
4. Giving tv;o weeks notice on same day; 
5. Thrmving away incomplete sales books and an 
extra, used and outdated print-out, 
6. Taking and returning personal handwritten not 
7. Independent diversions of two orders; 
Nothing else was taken or destroyed by respondents. It 1vOL 
be an unjustified request to require this court or the loi>E 
court to fabricate an "iceberg" when the preponderance of 1 
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evidence showed that the alleged "tip" was the entire picture 
created partially by a few mistakes in judgment. 
The appellant, prior to respondents termination, 
dealt vli th certain customers and suppliers and had jobs in 
progress, salesman attempting to secure other jobs, extra 
copies of print outs showing the names and addresses of their 
customers, other relevant information on jobs in progress, 
three catalogs in "''hich to find price and materials and 
adequate inventory. Appellant's status after respondents 
termination was not changed except for the reduction of its 
sales force. Appellant still had the same jobs in progress, 
they •.vere neither lost nor affected. It could still bid on 
jobs of its customers and obtain materials from its suppliers, 
and it still had all the necessary information to continue its 
business. It is true that one of its competitors had increased 
itscompetition by hiring some of the respondents but where 
there is no agreement of non competition the court and our 
society adhere to a strong policy favoring free competition in 
the economic sphere. 
The facts of this case and the holdings of the courts 
in the cases cited by appellant and respondents clearly 
demonstrate that respondents did not conspire to injure appel-
lant's business and although they ~ade a few mistakes in judgment 
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as they winded up their affairs with appellant, those mistake! 
neither affected appellant's ability to compete nor caused 
appellant to lose business. Appellant has been awarded 
judgment for the only damages that proximately resulted from 
respondents acts while employed by appellant. Appellant sh 
be denied any further relief and the judgment of the lmver 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully subMitted, 
ICHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney at Law 
455 East Fourth South 
Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-8733 
CERTIFICATE OF '1AILI:-Jr; 
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copy of the foregoing Brief of Res~ondent v1as placed in the 
United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, with postage 
thereon fully prepaid, this /~ay of August, 1977, address 
as follows: 
Joseph C. Rust 
Kirton, McConkie, Boyer & Boyle 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kenneth Schnaper 
Crane CoMpany 
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~ew York, New York 10022 
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